It seems to me that there continues to be confusion over the issue of merit. Many fear that introducing the term "merit" at all will lead to Pelagianism. Others insist that in order to preserve the Reformed system of doctrine, we must say that Adam "merited eternal life." I would like to offer here a few observations on this controversy.
As usual, if we are going to discuss the question of whether or not anyone can merit, we must have a solid idea of what merit is. We can consider merit as referring either to a good action that merits something good or an evil action that merits something bad. In this dicussion, we are talking about meriting something good. I would propose Turretin's definition found in XVII.v.6 of the Institutes of Elenctic Theology. He says that in order for someone to merit (in the sense of meriting some good thing), an action must:
1. Be undue, "for no on merits by paying what he owes."
2. That it be our own work.
3. That it be absolutely perfect and free from all taint.
4. That it be equal and proportional to the reward and pay.
5. That the reward be due to such a work from justice.
If someone wants to propose another definition, that is fine. Let us remember, however, in order for us to come to agreement on this issue, we must be clear on what we mean by "merit." Now, from this definition, I conclude several things:
1. On this basis, we must conclude with Turretin (XVII.v.7) that "there now can be no merit in man with God by works whatsoever, either of congruity or of condignity." This is true even of Adam before the fall, as Turretin notes. On the basis of this definition, there are not three types of merit: condign, congruent, and pactum. If we use that sort of terminology, we must recognize that we are not speaking of three species in a genus but rather of a strict and loose use of the term.
2. To say that pre-fall Adam could merit eternal life before the fall is a loose use of the term. Adam's obedience was not undue, it was not proportional to the reward, and it was not a matter of strict justice, considered in itself. However, we may call it "pactum merit" if we wish since the reward was offered by a covenant on the condition of perfect obedience, since the obedience would have been without stain, and since the work would have been Adam's own work. However, if someone does not want to call Adam's gaining of eternal life "merit," it seems to me that this alone should not be a reason for separation of brethren.
3. There is no sense in which the good works of a Christian man can be called meritorious. How could something be considered meritorious that not only meets none of the criteria listed here but also would be worthy of damnation (because of its imperfections and considered in itself)? Nothing should be called meritorious that, considered in itself, would merit damnation.
4. The work of Christ on the cross was in the strictest sense meritorious. The work on the cross can be considered either as a punishment for our sin or as obedience to the Father (Rom. 5:19). This work was undue, was His own, absolutely perfect, proportional to the reward, and should be rewarded according to strict justice. (See Jean Claude's excellent essay on this point here).
5. Finally, we may have differences on what should be called merit; but if we can agree on the substance of the matter, then the debate over words will disappear. It seems to me that the substance of the issue is this:
a. Did Adam have an eschatology before the fall?
b. Was the attainment of that eschatology conditioned on perfect obedience?
c. Has Jesus Christ obtained and merited an inalienable right to eternal life for His elect by His obedience?
d. Do all true believers possess an inalienable and unlosable right to eternal life the moment they believe in Jesus Christ on the basis of His merits alone and apart from any consideration of our obedience?
Even here, c and d seem to be much more important than a and b. However, if someone denies a and b, as Brakel warned, they will be very likely to eventually deny c and d.
Abraham’s Faith: Romans 4.3
6 hours ago
45 comments:
Wes,
How is Christ’s work undue when He was a man just as Adam who had to obey the covenant of works? Now, I know Christ had to take on punishment but that doesn’t explain how his active obedience is meritorious if Adam’s active obedience would not have been? Or to put it another way, why would Christ’s obedience to the covenant be a matter of strict justice, but Adam’s obedience to essentially the same covenant not be?
Ronnie
Great post. I will link to it.
Ronnie,
First, notice that I referred to His work on the cross as undue. I did not refer to the obedience of His whole life (though I think that can be understood as "undue" in a certain sense).
We cannot say that Christ was absolutely bound to go to the cross; otherwise, it would be a punishment suffered for Himself and not for others.
What I'm saying here is that the work on the cross can be thought of in two ways. First, it was a punishment that He received that was due not to Himself but unto us (passive obedience). Second, it was a good work that was meritorious in the strictest sense (active obedience). The reward of His work is that the elect receive the inheritance of eternal life (Heb. 9:15).
Wes, can we not also say that Christ's incarnation was undue as well?
Lane, of course. God as God was not required to become man.
However, we should remember that once Christ had become man, He owed obedience as man to God. However, even in that relation, there was no intrinsic necessity for Him to give His life as a ransom for others. That is why this act, above all, is considered meritorious and why, I believe, the Scripture constantly refers to His death as the cause not only of gaining forgiveness but also eternal life for His people (Rom. 5:19, Heb. 9:15).
Great post. Notice that at the end, even the slippery slope a Brakel notes does not apply to the FV, who all agree that perfect obedience was required of Adam.
Joshua W.D. Smith
First, notice that I referred to His work on the cross as undue. I did not refer to the obedience of His whole life (though I think that can be understood as "undue" in a certain sense).
Was the work on the cross really undue? Wasn’t this due if Christ wanted to redeem his people? It was undue if Christ only wanted to justify himself based on the covenant of works, but being that he fulfilling the covenant for his people it was due, right?
We cannot say that Christ was absolutely bound to go to the cross; otherwise, it would be a punishment suffered for Himself and not for others.
But he was bound if He was doing this to redeem His people.
What I'm saying here is that the work on the cross can be thought of in two ways. First, it was a punishment that He received that was due not to Himself but unto us (passive obedience).
But it was due to him for the redemption of His people.
Second, it was a good work that was meritorious in the strictest sense (active obedience). The reward of His work is that the elect receive the inheritance of eternal life (Heb. 9:15).
If his active obedience was strict merit in that he fulfilled the covenant of works, why wouldn’t Adam’s perfect obedience to the covenant of works have been the same?
Ronnie
Ronnie,
Of course Jesus was obligated to pay for the sins of His people, if He committed Himself to do so. The question, though is, was He obligated by an intrinsic necessity to commit Himself to pay for the sins of His people.
As for your last question, I believe that they are different for the reasons I explained in my post. Where do you find fault with my reasoning? You can see my reasoning also in a post on the main page entitled, "Merit and the Covenant of Works."
However, just to make it simple, the reason why Jesus could merit in a strict sense eternal life and salvation from hell and why Adam could not do the latter and could only do the former in a much lesser sense is this. Jesus was and is the God-man. Adam is a mere man.
It seems to me that there is another consideration here too, and that concerns the question of the very origin of merit in the relationship between God and man.
As I understand it, merit between God and man has its origins in the essential and economic aspects to the relationship between the Father and the Son. Specifically, the Son is not just the Son; He is also a man and a servant (Phil 2:6-8) and a minor under a pedagogue (Gal 4:1-5). These facts have enormous implications for our understanding of merit.
On the one hand, a relationship of strict merit does exist between the Father and the Son by Their very essence as the perfectly worthy God. Each Person merits—each Person is due—the worship of the Other.
On the other hand, though not essential to Their Deity, there is also a relationship of covenantal [pactum] merit between the Father and the Son, and that relationship is as eternal as the counsel of God in which the plan of redemption was determined. To be specific, by submitting to humiliation to fulfill His role in redemption, the Son covenantally merited—He was covenantally due—the reward of exaltation from the Father in eternity past.
In other words, the Son's humiliation necessitated His introduction into the realm of covenantal merit, wherein the Son and the Father were related no longer only as God with God but now also as God with man, as lord with servant, and as father with minor. For such humiliation, and indeed for submission to the will of His God and Father, the Second Person of the Trinity was rewarded by the First Person of the Trinity with exaltation after humiliation (Phil 2:9-11; Rom 1:4).
There is, then, a connection between the Son's humiliation and covenantal merit: covenantal merit originates in the Son's submission to humiliation. To put it differently, there are both essential and economic aspects to the relationship of the Father and the Son, and covenantal merit is a necessary component of Their economic relationship as strict merit is a necessary component of Their essential relationship.
Of course Jesus was obligated to pay for the sins of His people, if He committed Himself to do so. The question, though is, was He obligated by an intrinsic necessity to commit Himself to pay for the sins of His people.
No, he wasn’t obligated to commit Himself to pay for the sins of man, because he didn’t have to enter into the covenant of work or covenant of redemption for them. Likewise, his obeying God’s commandments is of no value to the elect without a covenant. Therefore, in the end we are talking about condign, congruent, or pactum merit within the covenant. The whole concept of looking at Christ’s merit outside the covenant(i.e. he wasn’t obligated by an intrinsic necessity) seems to be irrelevant to the debate.
As for your last question, I believe that they are different for the reasons I explained in my post. Where do you find fault with my reasoning? You can see my reasoning also in a post on the main page entitled, "Merit and the Covenant of Works."
However, just to make it simple, the reason why Jesus could merit in a strict sense eternal life and salvation from hell and why Adam could not do the latter and could only do the former in a much lesser sense is this. Jesus was and is the God-man. Adam is a mere man.
Yes, I understand a God-man was needed to satisfy the judgment of *enternal punishment*, however this is not so for receiving eternal life as Adam could have done it if he would have fulfilled the probationary period. So if we exclude the sufferings of the sins of others for second, let me ask you this. If both Christ and Adam would have fulfilled essentially the same covenant of work why is one condign merit and the other only pactum merit?
Ronnie
Dr White said:
There is, then, a connection between the Son's humiliation and covenantal merit: covenantal merit originates in the Son's submission to humiliation.
Yes, that is what I was getting at above. On what basis do we call Christ's fulfillment of the CoW condign merit, but we would call Adam's fulfillment of essentially the same CoW pactum merit. It seems to me they both should be considered pactum merit.
Ronnie
Why can't condition #3, as well as condition #4, be suspended under "pactum merit?"
Dr. White,
I have no problem with what you are saying at all (and I think it's very insightful!). However, I still think it leaves the question unanswered of whether or not the condition in the pact is intrinsically meritorious of eternal life. In Christ's sake, I say it is. In Adam's, I say it is not.
A covenant can either strengthen obligations that already exist or create new ones. The pact of redemption created new obligations that did not exist "before" (I recognize the frailty of our language here!).
Now this is more for Ronnie:
This leads us to the difference between Adam and Christ. Adam was bound by nature to give God all obedience as man. Christ was not bound by nature to give God obedience as man. Moreover, even as man, He would not be required by natural obligation to suffer a penalty that was due unto others.
Another reason why we should distinguish between the value of the work of Adam and the value of the work of Christ is because one is finite and the other infinite. Adam's work has the value of only one man. Christ's work is the work of the infinite and eternal Son of God and thus of infinite value and worth.
Ronnie, what do you feel that you would lose if you say that Adam could only "merit" eternal life in a loose sense while Christ would merit it in a strict sense?
This leads us to the difference between Adam and Christ. Adam was bound by nature to give God all obedience as man. Christ was not bound by nature to give God obedience as man. Moreover, even as man, He would not be required by natural obligation to suffer a penalty that was due unto others.
Adam was bound by nature in the sense because he was created in covenant. At the incarnation Christ was also bound by nature. Christ’s merit is based on the covenant and therefore it is a pactum merit.
Another reason why we should distinguish between the value of the work of Adam and the value of the work of Christ is because one is finite and the other infinite. Adam's work has the value of only one man. Christ's work is the work of the infinite and eternal Son of God and thus of infinite value and worth.
Adam’s work had the value of only one man? Wouldn’t Adam’s work have merited eternal life for him and all his posterity? I would agree that Christ’s work was of more value than Adam’s because of who He was, however it was still pactum merit because it was based on the covenantal agreement.
Ronnie, what do you feel that you would lose if you say that Adam could only "merit" eternal life in a loose sense while Christ would merit it in a strict sense?
It loses nothing, but it is a slippery slope. It could lead to the argument that Adam merits eternal life in a strict sense if he would have fulfilled essentially the same covenant that Christ fulfilled and merited eternal life in a strict sense.
Ronnie
I'm wondering about your #4. I think I recall Charnock saying something to the effect that the work of Christ was *not* strictly meritorious because to say that it was would be in effect to deny that God is gracious to sinners in accepting the work of a Surety when He could have demanded payment from them.
For Charnock I think, to say that the work of Christ was strictly meritorious would be to say that the Father would have been *obligated* to accept it, even if there had been no pactum salutis.
Thus for Charnock, Christ's merit was pactum merit. What do you think?
Ronnie,
Speaking for myself I would not call Christ's fulfillment of the CoW condign merit. It was covenantal or pactum merit.
The distinction between strict and covenantal/pactum merit (and strict and covenantal/pactum justice) must not be confused with that between condign and congruent merit developed by medieval Roman Catholic scholastics. Condign merit was taken to be “full merit,” i.e., merit fully equal to the reward rendered, while congruent merit was taken to be “half-merit,” i.e., merit less than the reward rendered, the difference between reward and merit attributed to grace. (See Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, s.vv. meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo [pp. 191-92].) The whole congruent/condign merit distinction makes sense only within the larger scheme of infusionist justification. It is alien to the construct of imputationist justification that defines Reformation (and especially Reformed, covenantal) soteriology. Among other problems with the infusionist scheme, it saw merit as something “deserving of grace”—an oxymoronic phrase incompatible with the Biblical doctrine of grace as favor contrary to ill desert.
Wes,
Thanks for the interaction. When you refer to the question of whether the condition in the pact is intrinsically meritorious of eternal life, I pause and ask, Isn't it the case, however, that the pactum itself, or better the maker of the pactum himself, answers the question? In other words, the question of whether the condition is meritorious is answered by God, hence the condition's merit is extrinsically determined.
I'm still thinking this through with you and others. What do you think?
Dr R.F. White,
Sorry about the confusion, I was attempting to agree with your point. I also appreciate the distinctions you make, because it seems to be a more consistent convenantal approach.
Thanks,
Ronnie
Hello Joshua,
There may be some on your side of things that would not affirm our need for perfect obedience. Mr. Shepherd admits that language is in the WCF, however he denies it is scriptural.http://my.opera.com/BarryHofstetter/blog/show.dml/109065
He said as much in discussion at Trinity OPC during the Newberg lectures
Dick
Drs White,
Thinking about this it seems to me that the whole discussion of strict merit or non-strict merit is wrongheaded when dealing with a covenant. It doesn’t matter if the works are of a greater( what merit qualification would this be), lesser, or equal value to the reward, it is always pactum merit. The other categories only bring confusion because if it is non-strict merit people start describing it as grace. So we have to the two types of covenants, conditional and unconditional. Conditional covenants are covenants of work and unconditional covenants are covenants of grace. The conditional covenant is always meritorious, that is pactum merit.
Ronnie
Wes,
You stated:
However, if someone does not want to call Adam's gaining of eternal life "merit," it seems to me that this alone should not be a reason for separation of brethren.
Here is the problem. If you do not call it merit then what is the other choice? Grace. Of course that leads to other problems. So it seems everyone must affirm it is merit in some sense( pactum merit being the most accurate)or we get the confusion we are dealing with now from the FV.
Ronnie
Ronnie,
Thanks for your two follow-up comments.
I think you are exactly right when you comment that a distinction between strict and non-strict merit is out of place in the context of covenant or pactum. To express your point in other words, we should not do what the medieval Roman Catholic scholastics did by importing into the pactum the concept of "grace," particularly (though not only) when it is construed within an infusionist scheme. If I understand it correctly, to make "grace" an invariable component of the pactum compels us to say that the Father's reward to the Son for His humiliation involved grace. No, there was favor, but not grace: the two are not synonymous. This is where, in my understanding, the distinction between conditional and unconditional is important and clarifying.
Can we say "gift", if we can't say "grace"?
And why not say Grace in the "strict" sense is favor in terms of ill desert, but in a "looser" sense is favor.
What's the point: well just like we can see the ANALOGIES of real merit and loose merit, we can see the analogies of strict Grace and looser Grace.
David, I think your question gets at the heart of the issue and that is that "pactum merit" does not exclude the question of intrinsic value.
# 4 in my definition states that the work is proportional to the pay. The fact that God had to accept that pay does not negate the fact of proportion.
Consider:
1. God did not have to save sinners or accept a surety in their place.
2. If He did accept a surety, it would have to be a surety that could provide a payment proportional to the reward.
3. Christ's sacrifice was proportional to the reward - namely, releasing sinners from hell. He fully paid a price that was set not only by God's determination but also by inherent value.
4. In the case of a free reward where sin is not involved, God might offer more than what is due. However, in this case, His justice required an infinite punishment. He could not by covenant have simply said, "I will accept the death of another sinner in the place of a sinner." That would have been contrary to His justice.
Consequently, the existence of covenant does not negate the issue of inherent value.
Dr. White,
If the only issue was what constitutes a condition for obtaining eternal life, then the question might be settled by a simple reference to the pact. However, I believe there are other issues involved.
Consider, for example, the following:
1. Death as a punishment for sin is not merely something assigned by the covenant, but sin is inherently worthy of death.
2. Christ's death is not merely proportional to hell on the basis of the covenant but on the basis of the inherent value of the sacrifice.
3. If we say that Adam was not inherently worthy of eternal life in virtue of creaturely obedience, we magnify the goodness of the Creator in freely offering such to Him. It also presses home the greatness of the Creator/creature distinction.
4. The distinction of the strict merit of Christ and the "pactum merit" of Adam emphasizes the "how much more than" of the 2nd Adam, so often emphasized by the Apostle Paul.
5. It glorifies Christ to say that He merited for His people not merely in terms of the pact but in virtue of a condignity or of an inherent proporition between the work and the reward.
6. By emphasizing that Adam could not merit eternal life by the inherent worth of his obedience before the fall, we have completely shut the door on any merit for sinners.
There are probably more advantages to this distinction, but I think those are sufficient to illustrate the point. Above all, I believe that these things are accurate and so worth saying.:)
Pduggie,
I think that's a good distinction. I have no problem using the term "grace" before the fall, if we understand "grace" as unmerited favor. The classic Reformed theologians did it constantly. I think that your distinction, though, is a helpful one in that it recognizes that the primary context of grace is "merited disfavor" while in a looser sense we may apply it to the situation before the fall.
The semantic range of "grace" simply is broader than the post-fall situation, and I don't think anyone can deny that who does a careful study of the use of the word in Greek. If someone wants to use it in a more restricted sense, then they should recognize that this is narrower than its normal usage and not be overly contentious about it (and vice versa on the other side).
Wes White said:
David, I think your question gets at the heart of the issue and that is that "pactum merit" does not exclude the question of intrinsic value.
Pactum merit is based on the conditions of the covenant, without any necessary qualification of intrinsic value. Now this doesn’t mean that intrinsic value does not come into play when the covenant arraignments are determined, but instead it simply means that regardless of the value it is still pactum merit. For example, the intrinsic value could be greater, equal, or less than the reward, it is still pactum merit. Therefore, Christ’s merit in the covenant of works is still pactum merit. Now, because of God’s justice, Christ’s death had to have a certain intrinsic value in order for God to justly make it a condition for redeeming sinners, but that was determined in the covenant arraignment.
If I’m reading Dr R.F. White correctly that is what he is getting at when he says above:
” When you refer to the question of whether the condition in the pact is intrinsically meritorious of eternal life, I pause and ask, Isn't it the case, however, that the pactum itself, or better the maker of the pactum himself, answers the question?In other words, the question of whether the condition is meritorious is answered by God, hence the condition's merit is extrinsically determined.”
So I don't believe there is anything wrong with mentioning the value is greater, equal, or less than the reward as long as we continue to say in all cases it is pactum merit. Do you have a problem with that?
Thanks for the interaction.
Ronnie
Ronnie,
What is your definition of pactum merit? If you say that it is a condition which obtains something in some way, then you are using "merit" in a different sense than I am. I believe that merit is a concept that exists apart from the covenant and is distinct from the covenant. Consequently, whether something may be called meritorious in terms of a pact will have to be evaluated in each particular instance.
What is your definition of pactum merit? If you say that it is a condition which obtains something in some way, then you are using "merit" in a different sense than I am. I believe that merit is a concept that exists apart from the covenant and is distinct from the covenant. Consequently, whether something may be called meritorious in terms of a pact will have to be evaluated in each particular instance..
Merit - to earn or deserve something. In a covenant the stipulations determine what is to done in order to merit( earn or deserve) the reward. It is pactum merit, because it is based on the arraignment of the covenant whether the value is greater, equal, or less than the reward. I agree that merit is distinct from a covenant, but I’m not sure the concept of meriting something has any meaning outside of a covenant or agreement. Can you give an example of when it does?
"Death as a punishment for sin is not merely something assigned by the covenant, but sin is inherently worthy of death."
Isn't it the case that damning the human race on the basis of Adam's sin IS merely something assigned by the covenant though?
Pduggie, good question. My inclination would be to say that there is some sort of inherent proportionality there. However, I'll have to study and think on that one. If you find a good answer, I'd be happy to know about it.
Ronnie,
The definition you are offering is much broader than mine. If you define merit as "earn" or "deserve" I can think of many things that earn or deserve something and thus, by your definition, merit something. If my daughter cleans the basement without being asked, she deserves to be praised for it. If someone is an alcoholic, they have earned my suspicion when they ask for $5!
The point I'm making here is that the definition that we have of merit will determine where we see it. I do not think that this is completely arbitrary. There is sometimes a broad semantic range that can cover many things. This does not mean that anything can mean anything. Obviously, a car or a tree cannot be considered merit!
Gents,
This is a helpful exchange for me at least, as I think through how to best express these points.
My thoughts are in line with pduggie and with Ronnie on the question of whether that which is meritorious (valuable, worthy) is intrinsic or extrinsic. It is the pactum maker(s) who decides what has merit (worth, value), in whatever proportion.
Following through on that point, I would say that it was God who determined that Adam's sin would have the demerit that it did for all and not just for Adam himself, and this was the case because it was God who had determined to make Adam the representative of the pactum of creation between God and man. My point is that it is God who assigns what is meritorious (valueable, worthy) and in what proportion.
Wes, why do you think it is necessary to argue that that which is meritorious must be so intrinsically? What is at stake in that affirmation?
Hi Wes,
The definition you are offering is much broader than mine. If you define merit as "earn" or "deserve" I can think of many things that earn or deserve something and thus, by your definition, merit something. If my daughter cleans the basement without being asked, she deserves to be praised for it. If someone is an alcoholic, they have earned my suspicion when they ask for $5!
When I used earn or deserve in reference to merit, I meant you are obligated to give them the reward as a matter of justice. You were not obligate to praise you daughter and she should desire your praise every time she did a gracious act for you. Neither are you obligated to treat the alcoholic with suspicion. You may do that or you may not for whatever reason.
However, in the case of Christ and Adam, God was obligated because of the covenant to give them the curses or the blesses based on their carrying out of the stipulations.
The point I'm making here is that the definition that we have of merit will determine where we see it. I do not think that this is completely arbitrary. There is sometimes a broad semantic range that can cover many things. This does not mean that anything can mean anything. Obviously, a car or a tree cannot be considered merit!
Yes, I agree we need to define the term, but in defining it we have to use it consistent. So would you say Christ active obedience strictly merited righteousness that was imputed to us, and therefore Adam’s active obedience to the covenant of work would have strictly merited righteousness to be imputed to us if he would have obeyed perfectly?
Thanks,
Ronnie
Dr. White, see my comments in the previous post that I addressed to you. That is what I feel is at stake here. In general, to say that value of something is simply fixed by God in my mind can lead to the most radical form of nominalism. Thus, as some of the Scotist theologians debated, since every value of every thing and act was determined by God, then Christ could have become a donkey and saved us, if God had so willed it. Obviously, there's more to it than that.
Secondly, I believe it's unscriptural. The value of the body and the soul and of birds and plants is determined irrespective of the covenant. Thus, Christ says, "You are of more value than many sparrows." He also says, "What can a man give in exchange for his soul?" There is some inherent value in things based on their nature and effects apart from covenant. However, difficult it may be to define at times, I do believe that it is true.
Gentlemen,
Thanks for your interaction on these posts. I greatly appreciate the content and the manner with which you have interacted.
Ronnie,
I would frame your last question a bit differently. I think it is accurate to say on Rom. 5 and 1 Cor. 15:
Christ's obedience is imputed to the elect; therefore, Adam's obedience would have been imputed to his posterity.
I do not think it is accurate to say:
Christ's act of going to the cross and dying for His people was inherently meritorious; therefore, Adam's obedience would have been inherently meritorious.
In the first example, the comparison holds good. Both were covenantal representatives of their seed. In the second place, the comparison does not hold good for all the reasons I wrote in my post. In other words, Adam and Christ are similar and yet different.
Wes,
Fair enough. Perhaps posing the question as an either/or, when it is a both/and is an error. That is, might we say that that which is meritorious is such for reasons that are both extrinsic and intrinsic to it?
Dr. White, I think we certainly can, and we must just be clear (whenever possible) on what those elements are. That's what I tried to do in my original post.
I think a good example of what you're talking about is Christ's satisfaction. Christ's death was inherently an exact equivalent to the punishment of eternal hell for the whole human race. However, as I noted earlier, it was also due to God's goodness that He was willing to accept that equivalent payment in the place of sinners, who themselves had merited the punishment. Moreover, God also determined that He would only accept that satisfaction for certain chosen sinners and not all of them.
Perhaps that is an example of how intrinsic and extrinsic factors worked together.
Wes,
These questions are only in reference to active obedience and the imputation of righteousness, since Adam did not have sin to deal with pre-fall. You would say for Christ it is strict merit because He is the God-man. Does this mean Christ could have obeyed the CoW for one day or one year and it would have had the same intrinsic value or did it only get that value from adhering to the specific CoW arrangement (i.e. specific number of days)? And on what basis do you arrive at your answer?
Thanks,
Ronnie
Ronnie,
I'm not really sure about the length of time. Better minds than mine will have to answer that one (if it can be answered at all).
While discussing inherent value, we can premise some things such as man is more valuable than a bird. However, when we try to get more specific, the question becomes much more difficult, such as if we asked, "Is an eagle more valuable than a sparrow?"
Hi Wes,
I guess we have just about exhausted this one, but I do have a few more comments as to why I’m still not totaled convinced even though I think you have made so good points.
I'm not really sure about the length of time. Better minds than mine will have to answer that one (if it can be answered at all).
Well, I wonder how you are sure that it was strict merit because of the intrinsic value of the work? Is it just because God accepted it? But of course God would have accepted Adam’s work also? Seems to me like this is only speculation, because I don’t see it derived from revelation by good and necessary consequence.
While discussing inherent value, we can premise some things such as man is more valuable than a bird. However, when we try to get more specific, the question becomes much more difficult, such as if we asked, "Is an eagle more valuable than a sparrow?"
Yes, I agree. We can say in a lot of cases some things are more valuable than others. The God-man’s life and work are of more value than Adam, however determining the exact worth is much more difficult if not impossible, so instead of speculating if the intrinsic value is strict merit or non-strict merit would it be better to just say it is pactum merit?
Also, I asked this question above and I will ask it again although it is not only meant for you to answer. What word beside merit is acceptable in reference to Adam fulfilling the CoW? Is grace acceptable? I heard John Gertnser speaking on the distinction between the CoW and CoG and he said one was mini-Grace and the other maxi-Grace :)
Grace and Peace,
Ronnie
R F White:
"It is the pactum maker(s) who decides what has merit (worth, value), in whatever proportion."
But didn't God already do that "by nature"? Why then does covenant theology posit covenant as something that comes in on top of nature.
pduggie,
In comments after the one you quote, we worked our way to an agreement that the worth/value/merit of something is not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic (as you put it, by nature).
Unless I'm overlooking it, I do think, however, that there is a weakness in Turretin's definition, in that he doesn't appear to construe his criteria of worth/value/merit with regard for the essential and economic aspects of the relationship between the Father and the Son. This observation applies to the first criterion. Isn't it the case that the Son did merit what He received from the Father by rendering to the Father what He owes? Or am I missing something? Wouldn't be the first time.
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